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THE WAYS OF PANGERMANY

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IT is a common remark both in America and in Europe that "there are two Germanys," the one warm-hearted, easily led, minutely efficient; the other ambitious, ruthless, scornful of public opinion because obstinately blind to its existence, and so confident in the perfection of its adjustments that it seeks to impose them on the whole happy-go-lucky world.

The one of these groups, though split up into more than a dozen factions, possesses most of those qualities a tolerant world was wont to admire as German scholarship, German friendliness, and German efficiency.

The other group, uncompromising, vindictive and determined, is represented and controlled by the "Alldeutschtum Verband" or "Pangerman Union." The word "Pangermanism" designates the tenets and acts of this society. It is in no proper sense to be compared with the similar terms, Panslavism and Panamericanism. The first of these represents an uncrystallized political sentiment reactionary in most regards, but incoherent in action. The second is, at the most, an expression of geographical good will.

Pangermanism is a call to action, and action of a very definite kind, the substitution, in a world carelessly dominated by the English-speaking races, of a well-knit and coherent system of Germanic discipline. Behind this it is an organized league of exploiters, aristocrats, militarists and visionaries willing to go to any lengths in or out of Germany to advance their own purpose. Closely associated with these is a General Staff, "persistently disloyal to the German government."¹

One of the most characteristic statements of the ultimate purpose of Pangermanism is that attributed to Professor von Stengel. He is cited as opposed to the Hague Conferences and similar attempts at International agreement because no such conferences would be necessary under a "German Peace" or the "superstate in which Germany would enforce order on the world."

He is quoted as saying:²

¹ "The Defeat of the German General Staff," Herbert Sidebotham, *Atlantic Monthly*, November, 1916.

² Herbert Bayard Swope, "Germany for a World State Born of War," *New York World*, November, 1916.

The one condition of prosperous existence, especially for the neutrals, is submission in our supreme direction. Under our overlordship all International Law would become superfluous for we of ourselves and instinctively give to each one his rights.³

That the activity of Pangermanists gave the direct impulse to the present war as well as to the insane military rivalry which came so near making the war inevitable is a matter of history. It is also clear that the future development of Europe hinges on the ability of the German people to control these elements, as after the Boer war the British people were able to hold in check the like elements among themselves. In all nations the struggle for freedom appears to the privileged classes as disunion and an abatement of the "patriotism" of international hate. Such conflicts exist in every country, but nowhere else have the elements of reaction been so thoroughly integrated as in Prussia.

The *Alldeutschtum Verband* for the promotion of German world-control was organized in Berlin on the ninth day of April, 1891. Just before this, in November, 1890, the German government had ceded to Great Britain the island of Zanzibar in Africa, receiving in return the island of Heligoland in the North Sea, not far from the German coast. Zanzibar was the key to vast colonial possessions rich in the "Mirage of the Map," to borrow a phrase from Norman Angell. This fitted into the scheme of the "Cape-to-Cairo Railway" and with other plans of British Imperialism.

Heligoland was a small island, apparently destined at last to be washed away by the waves, then known mainly as a summer resort. But it had potential value as a guard to the German coast, and, with the Kiel Canal, as a shelter to the German navy. This exchange was mainly the work of the young Kaiser, and at the time it aroused considerable criticism, for it seemed to sacrifice Germany's colonial interests to a secondary matter of local defense.

The *Alldeutschtum Verband* stood against policies of conciliation of whatever kind. It was therefore, from the first, in opposition to the acts of the ministry in power, for no government on earth can subsist without a certain degree of conciliation and compromise. Its center was among the agrarian nobility. With these men were associated imperialists, expansionists, militarists, advocates of a "vigorous foreign policy," and among them were naturally army officers and dignitaries of the church. For, as John A. Hobson has shown, the army is always the "right arm of privilege" and "its left arm is the state church." We are told:⁴

³ This attitude stands in direct opposition to the blunt dictum attributed to Bismarck, "None of this cock-o'-the-walk business for Germany; Europe won't stand it."

⁴ Ernest Denis, "Le Mouvement Pacifiste," Berne, 1916.

In the beginning the League counted among its directors personages of the highest rank, such as Cardinal Bopp, bishop-prince of Breslau, and the Count von Stolberg-Wernigerode, former governor of East Prussia.

Professor Hermann Feinau observes:

In Germany the chauvinist pro-war agitation has been promoted and encouraged among the most influential circles by the Junkers, militarists and Pangermanists. In the Pangerman Union (*Altdeutscher Verband*), in the Navy League (*Flottenverein*), the Defense League (*Wehrverein*), and similar associations, Germany already possessed gigantic organizations, extending over the whole empire, which were preparing her in accordance with a definite program for the "inevitable" war for world supremacy.⁵

The actual leadership of the League has never been made conspicuous. It would appear that its executive heads have mainly been retired generals and admirals. Occasionally professors, as Carl Hasse of Leipzig, have served this purpose. In general, however, some "respectable person of bourgeois origin" is made president, such choice serving to obscure the aristocratic-plutocratic-militaristic nature of the organization. Its present executive, Herr Class, chauvinistic but undistinguished, seems to bear out this statement. Under its auspices, "Capitalistic ventures" such as the "Land Owner's League," have promoted war-preparation and war-making in the interest of financial and territorial gain, and also as a backfire against socialism and democracy.

The society numbered in 1897 about 12,000 persons, in 1902, 22,000. In 1914 the number was estimated about 30,000. It was reported some twelve years ago that 2,300 members were resident in foreign countries, part of them naturalized, part remaining alien. Twenty-three of the two hundred and seventeen chapters forming the union had then been established in foreign countries, largely to bring expatriates, wherever placed, into the direct service of the League.

The avowed purpose of the union was to deepen national feeling and to force the German people to recognize their responsibilities as a "world power" to nations overseas. It has strenuously upheld the doctrine that for the state there can be no question of morals, for above the state there exists no power to compel obedience; hence the need for one supreme world state, powerful enough to ignore balances of power, and wise enough to form a complete overlord.

The immediate aims sought were these:⁶

1. A strong colonial and emigration policy for Germany.
2. The promotion of German schools in foreign countries.
3. The furtherance of patriotic feeling and the suppression of all tendencies opposed to nationalism.
4. The control of all education in the interest of national policy.

⁵ "Weil Ich ein Deutscher bin," English edition.

⁶ These statements and some other quotations are taken from private letters from German colleagues.

5. The cultivation and support of all nationalistic movements among Germans at home or abroad.
6. The furtherance of an energetic political movement in behalf of German financial interests (*Interessenpolitik*) both in and out of Europe, always determining the trend of foreign policy towards "practical results."

By "practical results" we must understand not national glory, but the purpose for which national glory is mainly evoked—financial gain.

The early work of the League was carried on chiefly in three directions:

1. Propaganda for naval expansion resulting in the formation of the Navy League (*Flottenverein*) and Army League (*Wehrverein*).
2. Propaganda in favor of the Boers, during the war in South Africa. ("500,000 marks were collected for this purpose during the Boer war.")
3. Attacks on the administration of the chancellor, Count von Caprivi, because of his conciliatory attitude towards the Poles.

To these may be added:

4. The Emperor's appeal for "the union and conservation of all the German tribes."
5. The necessity urged by von Moltke of "freeing the mouths of Germany's great rivers."

At home the efforts of the League served to promote the projects of expansion, exploitation and military expenditure. Abroad, the purpose was to lay especial stress on Foreign Germanism (*Das Deutschtum im Auslande*), and in this interest to foment international discord. At all times it has stood for war-at-any-price as the basis of national virility, and for those uncompromising policies which have made Germany feared or hated by other nations.

Among the notable catchwords or slogans of the Pangerman propaganda are these: "World Concerns" ("Welt-Politik"), "Big Business" ("Real-Politik"), "World War," "Slavic Peril," "Anglo-Saxon Menace," "British World-Monopoly," "French Revanche." Geographical aims are summed up in these expressions: "Berlin-Calais," "Berlin-Riga," "Hamburg-Salonica," "Hamburg-Bagdad-Persian Gulf."

Retired officers of the army and navy have been conspicuous among the spokesmen of the League. Their discussions have followed this "well-worn pattern, the splendors of war and the immorality of peace," leading up to "the absolute necessity of war for the realization of Germany's world ambitions."

The best-known and perhaps the ablest of these propagandists was General Friedrich von Bernhardi, ex-member of the General Staff, whose writings and speeches, lucid, logical and inhuman, need no

further notice here. Their keynote is found in these words, which the present writer heard Bernhardi utter:

Law is only a makeshift, the reality is force. Law is for the weak; power for the strong.⁷

More fiery and effusive than Bernhardi, but far less coherent and self-contained, is General von Keim, likewise a former member of the General Staff. Previous to 1914 he had traversed all Germany prophesying and urging war with England as well as with Russia. The following utterances are typical:

The way to German union and power is not paved with ink bottles, black type or parliamentary resolutions. It is marked by blood, wounds and deeds of arms. States are maintained by the means used in creating them. Hence the need of a strong army and a mighty fleet. . . . A secure place in the world is alone for that people which is filled with the spirit of war. . . . To the German youth it must be made clear, and to the German maiden as well, that it is your right to hate the enemies of your Fatherland. War, war on both frontiers! We must learn to hate, and to hate with method. A man counts little who can not hate to a purpose. Bismarck is but another name for hate.⁸

The late Admiral Breusing, ex-member of the Naval Staff, in an address in Basel, Switzerland, in 1913, fixed the date in which Germany would declare war, as the summer of 1914, a period also indicated by Bernhardi. Breusing described in detail the proposed policy of the German navy. This was to wear out the British fleet by minor attacks until, in a final conflict, the superiority of German guns and German seamanship should bring a culminating victory.

The German people have never governed themselves. And we may note that whenever, in any nation, the people neglect or fail to assume control of their own affairs, others will seize the lapsed sovereignty and use it in their own interest. Here was Pangermanism's opportunity. Brailsford asserts that "the function of the Prime Minister is to have his hands forced." Almost every German chancellor, from Caprivi to Bethmann-Hollweg, has had this experience, and at the hands of the Pangermanists.

The "stronger" the government of a nation, in the usual or military sense of the word, the more vulnerable, in a crisis. A "strong government," unhampered by parliamentary vote or by constitutional checks and balances, is at the mercy of intrigues from within. The first duty of a strong government, it is claimed, is to take care of the "interests," hereditary, military and financial, and its underpinning becomes honeycombed by their ramifying invasions. No government desires or expects that such elements should dictate its policy, but the farther removed from the people the feebler its power of resistance.

⁷ "Das Gesetz ist nur ein Versuch; die Wirklichkeit ist Gewalt: Gesetz ist für die Schwachen; Gewalt für die Starken."

⁸ "Das deutsche Chauvinismus," Ottfried Nippold, Frankfurt, 1913.

The policy of Prussia, and therefore of Germany, has been increasingly determined by the Pangermanist group. With a large use of sentiment, and especially of the swelling idea of German superiority, it has steadily advanced towards the exploitation of backward countries, the permeation of all regions by German agents, and the advancement of the German nobility. War-scares at home and abroad have furnished effective weapons. Its unyielding and contemptuous attitude in exaltation of military and naval efficiency has impelled other nations to lay aside their differences, internal and external, and to stand together in self-defense.

The movement of Pangermanism may be narrowly defined as an effort towards extended domination over the continent of Europe and towards control of colonial areas and protectorates in Asia and Africa. By various devices it has secured a strong hold on the court, in military circles and among the "intellectuals" of the schools and universities. It has largely directed the "*marcheroute*" of the press, and through the all-potent Ministry of Public Instruction, it has debarred scholars of democratic tendencies from appointment to professorships, on the other hand insuring in almost every university the presence of professors of history and politics in line with its assumptions. It is the social, political and military agent of reaction in Germany, and it has fortified itself as the visible stronghold of German patriotism. It has been a large factor in turning the government itself into a huge business combination run for the advantage of wealthy corporations, which receive rebates and subsidies of various kinds, and who, in turn, care for their employees assiduously, but with a sole idea to getting from them the highest possible service for the least possible expenditure. Pangermanism has furnished the German people a "*Kultur*" or discipline of which the leading feature is not personal initiative, the discipline of the individual, but obedience and uniformity, the discipline of the caste. It has apparently disclosed the spectacle of a gigantic, peaceful, unified empire which, "in shining armor," would hold its neighbors as well as its "vassal states" in peace. This it would accomplish through its own industrial and military supremacy, and through the unity and continuity of purpose which comes from autocratic as distinguished from parliamentary government. The great advantage German discipline would confer on the rest of the world would, it was held, outweigh and justify the sorrow and desolation which might be incidentally caused in the process of extension of these salutary and profitable methods. The assumed superiority of the Germans gives them unquestioned might. "Might creates need and need makes right."

The aggregate efforts of the Pangerman Union pointed towards the condition in which Germany found herself at the outset of the war. In brief, the nation had become a gigantic business corporation in which

every force, internal and external, was devoted towards the advancement of certain favored groups, agrarian, industrial, commercial, financial. To this end were directed all available resources, rebates, subsidies, interlocking directorates, tariffs, underselling in foreign markets at rates less than the cost of production at home, crushing of rivals, native or foreign, the paternal care of workmen with corresponding repression of unrest and of ambition. This system rested largely on borrowed capital. Its methods necessitated constant and rapid expansion, and in the end it must defeat itself. The form chosen for the final crash was international war.

This "frenzied finance" of Germany had its parallel in other nations, but rival combinations were less efficient, less bold, less successful in their hold on governments or people. Yet for years it has been true that the chancelleries of Europe in general have been only the firm names under which exploiters of Asia and Africa have carried on their enterprises.

Before the war, to the German people at large, the efforts of the Pangermanists seemed of little importance. While I was in Bavaria, in 1913, Bernhardt was described to me as a "disgruntled cavalry officer who had failed of promotion." Not much stress was laid on his utterances, and even his startling book on "Germany and the Next War" was scarcely noticed by the intellectual classes. The land was prosperous and peaceful, endangered only remotely by the alleged jealousy of "commercial rivals" in England, and by the menace of "natural enemies" in France and Russia. The Emperor, himself, however, devoted to war-display and to the heroics and romanticism of force, apparently had no desire to waste substance in actual warfare. The chancellor and the foreign minister were distinctly men of peace. It was generally agreed that the Pangermanists were "a mere handful of theorists," "extremist dreamers of world power, hardly to be taken seriously." Their efforts seemed to fall into the "stream of events," and few saw clearly that this very stream of events was largely of Pangermanist creating. After each crisis arose the question: "What else can we do?" And this furnishes the final argument for the plunge into war.

In every aggressive movement the Pangermanists have forced the pace and furnished the driving power. Says Kurt Eisner in the paper already quoted:

They have acquired a greater influence on the shaping of national policy than even the mightiest combination of interests among the great landholders and capitalists. . . . Although the government has always been arrayed against the unbridled policy of the Pangermans, nevertheless the conduct of its head has become more and more Pangermanist. This is because the government has always submitted eventually to what it first opposed, acting in agreement with the entire mass of public opinion played upon from Berlin by Centristic (reac-

tionary) influences. . . . From the first projected naval program to the most recent law for defense, every single plan for preparedness has originated in Pangermanist circles. They were the advance guards. . . .

The program of the Pangermanist Society is simple and clear. The "nationalistic" illusions are merely an idealistic by-product for the delectation of affiliated teachers and professors. The real goal is the acquisition of colonies where Germans may settle, where German peasants may cultivate the soil that may supply us with raw materials for our manufactures and use our products in exchange. That is the "sure market," the dream of the German export trade. . . .

This colonial empire can be obtained, according to the view of the Pangermanists, only by strengthening Germany's position as a power in Europe. For this universal military service must be pushed to the utmost limit, and there must be unhindered building of war-ships for whose efficiency the acquisition of coaling stations and naval bases is indispensable. . . .

Besides this the society has the cooperation of a staff of "intellectuals" whose activities extend everywhere. The latter, having acquired, mostly by foreign travel, certain kinds of knowledge and experience, are welcome to the press as experts whenever there is a controversy on world-politics. On such occasions these propagandists bob up as collaborators and information suppliers for the press, like snails after a rainstorm, and public opinion is delivered over almost defenseless to them. The secret and the danger of their influence lie in the fact that public opinion is invariably swept forward by the irresistible rush of events, while the Pangermanists by unflagging energy have for years been preparing these very events.

Only autocratic governments can pursue "a vigorous foreign policy," such policy admitting of no divided councils. Division of council constitutes the safeguard of democracy. Hence democracy fails relatively under the abnormal stress of war, while the weakness of autocracy appears in the ease by which war may be thrust upon it. War-making is incompatible with the methods and spirit of democracy. This fact, brilliantly set forth by Marcel Sembat (*Faites un Roi sinon Faites la Paix*), justifies the belief that a democratic Europe would be a conciliated Europe. As Jules Frœlich pointed out some years ago, "the Pangermanist movement is the sole obstacle to the formation of the United States of Europe." The continent, for the most part was ready for the essential realities of such a movement, though doubtless not for its administrative forms. The governments generally were not averse to mutually helpful international agreements. The Pangermanists, however, with the reactionaries everywhere, saw neither glory nor profit in international equality of rights. The idea of unlimited sovereignty rose above all rival conceptions. To them a sovereign state stands superior to all individuals, all treaties, all agreements, all morals, and is responsible to no authority. As Treitschke put it, a nation can be guilty of no sin save the unpardonable one, "the sin against the Holy Ghost" of being small or backward, and thus at the mercy of other states. In this view, war has no moral quality, good or bad. It is

⁹ "Le Pangermaniste en Alsace."

merely a process, a way to an end which, if attained, justifies the means. Thus exploitation, if successful, becomes a right, and small states exist only in the temporary convenience of great ones whose ultimate duty is to absorb them.

And as autocracy must maintain itself against the "noxious weeds" of the time—democracy, socialism, pacifism, and internationalism—it must finally rely for its permanence on foreign war, "the swift remedy," as Treitschke avers, "for internal disunion and waning patriotism."

The movement of Pangermanists may be looked upon as at once a conspiracy, a romance and a religion, romance and religion being primarily devices to conceal from a romantic and idealistic race the sordid materialism of its real aims. In practise it is a conspiracy against the freedom of the German people, on whom it would tighten the chains of military and industrial despotism. In exchange for liberty it would offer security, a tolerable present condition as a substitute for hope of future advancement. It is also a conspiracy against the freedom of surrounding nations, part of its purpose being to extend the Prussian system over all districts inhabited by people of Germanic origin, as well as over those which intercept Germany's road to the open sea, and those which lie in the way of her "*Drang nach Osten*."

The Pangermanist cult may be conceived as a romance in its reliance on medievalism and tradition. By devious arguments from history Pangermanists justify German claims on neighboring regions inhabited by races alleged to be of Teutonic origin, or which once yielded allegiance to the "Holy Roman Empire." Again romance appears in the pursuit of the "Mirage of the Map," in the ambition for overseas possession in "a vast continuous area which shall be purely German." In Africa the holdings, it was planned, should stretch from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, bound together by an interoceanic railway system, the whole to be ruled, according to Professor Hans Delbrück, "by an aristocracy of German planters who shall evolve a German-African national pride." Delbrück admits that there could be no economic gain to Germany in the ownership of such a black empire. It therefore would rest on no sordid expectation of profit. It is purely and solely a castle in the air, built up of "sheer sentimentality," a leading factor in all German affairs. This pursuit of romantic ideals by means of intimidation and force has had its effect on the Germans' estimate of themselves. Admitting all that we may of the profundity of German science, of German skill in the application of knowledge toward human betterment, of the nobility of the best art and the best literature of Germany, there remains, in these days, a great disparity between German greatness as the world sees it and as the Germans see it themselves. This chasm is indicated in part by the Pangermanist

contempt for other peoples, the "degenerate" French, the "worn-out" Italians (except when allies), the "barbarous" Russians, the "hypo-critical" British, and the "dollar-chasing" Americans. The unflinching lucidity of the French, the artistic sensitiveness of the Italians, the idealism of the Russians, the sanity of the British, the personal vigor of the Americans are unrecognized in the mystic wilds of Pangermany. This throws light on the marvelous failure to understand other peoples which has been the bane of Germany's diplomacy, even staying the march of her militarism. For the judgment of the world is a solid fortress against which armies break themselves in vain.

The philosophy of Pangermanism implies prismatic perversions of morals and of fact. Thus Dr. Hugo Münsterberg, professor in but not of Harvard University, in his recent book "Tomorrow," illustrates this:

Colonies will be grasped, seaports will be sought, and areas with untapped mines will be coveted, and yet it would be historically untrue to stamp even such aspirations as selfish aggression and as immoral lust of the conqueror . . . nationalistic ambition serving an idea is loyalty and faithfulness in the fulfillment of a mission which is received from history.

Thus the seizure of Kiau-Chau was an act of "idealistic devotion to the demands of the national soul." As for "German truth," the author continues:

I think it is a low view of scholarly truth and a lower view of patriotism that misleads the many to such criticisms [as to veracity]. They fancy that truth is only a kind of photographic copy of an outer reality. They are not aware that every so-called truth is a remolding of life-impressions, a reconstruction of experience, a free creation of the intellect which can never be severed from the purposes of the free creating mind.

Through romance, Pangermanism rises to be in a degree a sort of religion, a primitive religion of hate. It has, it is said, the approval of "our good old German God." Its ritual is thus indicated by Otto von Gottberg:

Love for one's brothers, for the Fatherland, the Emperor, and the Empire, for victory which will give peace to the living and rest to the dead, these are the teachings not alone of heathen, but of Christian belief. Therefore war is the highest, holiest exhibition of human action. . . . This is the Kingdom of Heaven for young Germany. It is, as it were, to knock at the door of our Lord God! ("*an unseres Herrgotts Thür zu klopfen*").¹⁰

A marked feature of the Pangermanist movement was the effort for the "recovery of lost Germans" ascribed to von Buelow in 1902. This plan is thus described by Bernhardii:¹¹

It should provide that the German element is not split up in the world, but remains in compact blocks, thus forming, even in foreign countries, political centers of gravity in our favor, markets for our exports, and centers for the diffusion of German culture.

¹⁰ Nippold, "Das deutsche Chauvinismus."

¹¹ "Deutschland und der Nächste Krieg," 1913.

The number of "lost Germans" who could be thus "recovered" and used in Pangermanist operations was reckoned in millions. It was claimed that the German element in the United States amounted to ten millions, with another ten millions in the rest of the outside world. This estimate, greatly exaggerated in the first place, proved very disappointing. The number of Germans who became political agents paid or unpaid was relatively small, not many thousands at the most, and their ill-timed services have been costly in other nations as well as in the United States. But it is a fact beyond question that men under control of the Pangerman Union have permeated every part of the world, and that they have been a large factor in bringing the name of Germany into disrepute even before they were called into special activity by the demands of war. According to John Hay, their operations "left Germany without a friend in the world except dependent Austria and subsidized Turkey."¹²

A concurrent purpose of *Alldeutschum* has been to compel the use of the German language wherever German control extends. It demands the complete extirpation of foreign words in Germany, as well as the suppression of all other tongues, French, Polish, Danish or Flemish among those alien peoples whose territories are included in German conquests. This process of "*Entwelschung*" (deforeignization), so irritating to the natives of Alsace-Lorraine, and to those of German origin even more than to those of French, has been pushed as a salutary necessity.

The influence of Pangermanism was dominant in the onset of the present war. Although the conflict was initiated and precipitated in Germany, the German people as such had no conscious part in the affair. To this day most of them believe that their nation was the innocent victim of an iron ring of eager enemies. It was relatively easy for the Pangermanists to persuade the populace that they had been encircled ("*eingekreist*"), and that war had been forced on them by Russia, by France, or by Great Britain, according to the demands of the occasion. For violent utterances could be culled in abundance from the foreign press, of exactly the same tenor as those of Keim, of Bernhardi, or of Count Reventlow, editor of the chief Pangermanist organ, *Die deutsche Tageszeitung* of Berlin. Unhappily every country, even our own, has its group of chauvinists and mischief-makers. It is significant that in early July, 1914, a group of international statesmen met in Paris to discuss, among other things, measures to save Europe from its "patriotic press."

An organization bent on violence is a special menace to an autocracy because autocracy possesses no safeguard against military pressure. In the democracies of Europe the military groups have been under a cloud.

¹² "Life and Letters of John Hay."

In France the party of "*revanche*" has been discredited and humiliated by the Dreyfus case and by the collapse of the futile heroics of Boulangerism. The calamitous Boer war unhorsed the British Tories. German reactionaries had met with no such check, having had largely their own way since the downfall of Napoleon. The revolution of 1848, directed against their methods, ended in the expatriation of the revolutionary leaders.

In the devious and halting diplomacy which followed the first Balkan war it is not difficult to trace the withering influence of Pangermanism. The futile establishment of the Kingdom of Albania which forced the second Balkan war, the unwillingness either to do justice to the Balkan peoples or to let them alone, the paralysis at critical moments of the honest efforts of the German government to work for peace—all these find explanation in the maneuvers of Pangermanism. To such intrigues we may ascribe Germany's contemptuous refusal to restrain Austria's menace to Serbia, her haughty declination to take part in a European conference, and the compulsory insistence of the General Staff that the Kaiser should declare war on France on pretexts or causes never verified and now known to have been trumped up. When previously the Kaiser and his prime minister had ventured to exert pressure on Austria to keep the peace, the effect was neutralized or perhaps suppressed by the Pangermanist, von Tschirsky, ambassador to Vienna. Take Jonescu, late prime minister of Roumania, has charged the responsibility for the attack on Serbia to the Pangermanist trio, Count Tisza, premier of Hungary, von Tschirsky, and their active agent in Austria, Forgach. Again, after Russia and Austria had reached some sort of peaceful understanding, the Pangermanists forestalled the Kaiser's acquiescence by organizing a monstrous popular uproar, the excuse being that Russia had begun to mobilize. In this demonstration the militaristic and clerical journals took an active part after the fashion of their kind.

Thus, on a basis of lies, emotion and patriotism, the Pangermanists arranged a crisis by which they swept Germany from her feet, and with it all Europe into the abyss. The Emperor and his government were forced to declare a war which they did not welcome, but for which Pangermanist pressure had made such thorough preparation that the nation apparently could not escape. The fateful word "mobilization" which brushes aside all civil authority, became the lever for Pangermanism's operations.

On July 30, three or four days before Germany's actual declarations of war, the semi-official organ, the *Lokal Anzeiger* of Berlin, under control of the Crown Prince and in full sympathy with the Pangermanists and without authority from the government, placarded the German cities with the premature statement that national mobilization

was ordered. This unwarranted act carried everywhere the certainty of war and "forced the hand" of the chancellor. It has long been known in Berlin that while the false statement was promptly telegraphed to St. Petersburg, where it produced great consternation and rushed the nation towards war, the telegrams in contradiction were suppressed in the Berlin office and not sent out until too late for them to have an effect.

By lies concerning France and by suppressed telegrams to Russia the war was brought on. "What else can we do?" was then the problem of Germany as well as of Russia and France. With nations armed to the teeth, the line of least resistance is the one which leads to war.

This "patriotic" trick invites comparison, as Mr. E. J. Dillon has shown, with Bismarck's mangled telegram at Ems which furnished the incident on which hinged the Franco-Prussian war.¹³

An anonymous Pangermanist using the pen-name of "Julius Alter,"¹⁴ able, ruthless and shameless, in a violent attack on von Bethmann-Hollweg, asserts that this act of the *Lokal Anzeiger* justified itself in the absolute necessity of war:

All Germany felt and knew that the fatal hour had struck. Only Bethmann-Hollweg clung to the hope that a peaceful solution of the "incident" could be found or at least that hostilities could be confined to Austria and Serbia. . . . It is plain that his untiring efforts to the very last hour, regardless of military happenings, were directed to prevent at any price the long, unavoidable war. In vain were the warnings of the General Staff. The Minister of War and men in authority in the naval department pointed in vain to the need of mobilization. They succeeded in half-convincing the Emperor of its absolute necessity. On Thursday, July 30, the afternoon police papers and the Berlin *Lokal Anzeiger* published the fact of the mobilization, but the interference of Bethmann-Hollweg served to nullify this decisive action.

In the matter of Belgium the military authorities similarly defined civil authority. "Junius Alter" goes on to say that

during the war the idea of the annexation of Belgium was to the chancellor like a red rag to a bull. He felt morally bound by this question, especially as on August 4, 1914, he invented a "breach of neutrality" for Germany and promised to make restitution. How, indeed, could the honorable Bethmann-Hollweg dream of holding Belgium after he had given his word?

That special interests play a rôle in the Belgian question, for which the word Antwerp is significant, need not be emphasized. . . . Not less gently did the Chancellor propose to deal with France. . . . That the sacrifices we were forced to make in the Vosges and on the Meuse line must be avoided in any future war, and that part of the Franco-Belgian coast would serve as a useful

¹³ For a full account of this affair see Dillon's "Ourselves and Germany," the account in question being quoted in the *World's Work* for November, 1910, page 10, under the title of "Another Ems Message."

¹⁴ "The German Empire on its Way to a Historical Episode," privately printed as confidential and anonymous; a translation given in the *Chicago Daily News*, July 15, 1916.

flank position against England—all this seems never to have occurred to Bethmann-Hollweg.

These and similar projects, the conquest of Belgium (and of Holland as well), the seizure of the two northern departments of France (Nord and Pas de Calais), the creation at Boulogne of the greatest seaport in Europe, the exaction of a huge indemnity from Paris, all were commonly discussed in Pangermanist circles when the writer was in Germany in 1913.

The man on the street refused to take them seriously. The German ministry, the two war portfolios certainly excepted, were opposed to the methods and plans of the Pangermanists. Their success in forcing war, and especially in the insistence on submarine operations, resulted in a bitter feud between the chancellor and the minister of marine, von Tirpitz. The Kaiser has apparently sided with the more moderate group, the retirement of von Moltke, von Tirpitz, and finally of von Falkenhayn, giving certainty to this view. However, for a considerable time the partisans of "frightfulness" prevailed, their specialties for terrorization, the submarine and the Zeppelin, being freely employed against life and property of non-combatants in the enemy countries, to the great loss of moral prestige on the part of Germany without compensating military advantages.

The real problem of the present is not how to "crush Germany," but how to redeem her from her Pangermanist betrayers. This only the Germans themselves can achieve, and this they seem likely to accomplish. The influence of Count Reventlow and his type is distinctly waning and the long-suppressed voices urging democratic control are more and more audible. If they can rise above the sordid and medieval ideals of Pangermanism, taking the future of their nation sanely into their own hands, and if their present rivals meet them with a like sanity, the greatest problem of civilization will be well on its way to solution. And permanent sanity for the world can be secured only by the complete separation of military force from financial adventure.